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ABSTRACT
To prevent credential stuffing attacks, industry best practice now
proactively checks if user credentials are present in known data
breaches. Recently, some web services, such as HaveIBeenPwned
(HIBP) and Google Password Checkup (GPC), have started provid-
ing APIs to check for breached passwords. We refer to such services
as compromised credential checking (C3) services. We give the first
formal description of C3 services, detailing different settings and
operational requirements, and we give relevant threat models.
One key security requirement is the secrecy of a user’s pass-
words that are being checked. Current widely deployed C3 services
have the user share a small prefix of a hash computed over the
user’s password. We provide a framework for empirically analyz-
ing the leakage of such protocols, showing that in some contexts
knowing the hash prefixes leads to a 12x increase in the efficacy
of remote guessing attacks. We propose two new protocols that
provide stronger protection for users’ passwords, implement them,
and show experimentally that they remain practical to deploy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Password database breaches have become routine [8]. Such breaches
enable credential stuffing attacks, in which attackers try to com-
promise accounts by submitting one or more passwords that were
leaked with that account from another website. To counter cre-
dential stuffing, companies and other organizations have begun
checking if their users’ passwords appear in breaches, and, if so,
they deploy further protections (e.g., resetting the user’s passwords
or otherwise warning the user). Information on what usernames
and passwords have appeared in breaches is gathered either from
public sources or from a third-party service. The latter democra-
tizes access to leaked credentials, making it easy for others to help
their customers gain confidence that they are not using exposed
passwords. We refer to such services as compromised credential
checking services, or C3 services in short.
Two prominent C3 services already operate. HaveIBeenPwned
(HIBP) [45] was deployed by CloudFlare in 2018 and is used by
many web services, including Firefox [14], EVE Online [10], and
1Password [4]. Google released a Chrome extension called Pass-
word Checkup (GPC) [9, 44] in February 2019 that allows users to
check if their username-password pair appears in a compromised
dataset. Both services work by having the user share with the C3
server a prefix of the hash of their password or of the hash of their
username-password pair. This leaks some information about user
passwords, which is problematic should the C3 server be compro-
mised or otherwise malicious. But until now there has been no
thorough investigation into the damage from the leakage of current
C3 services or suggestions for protocols that provide better privacy.
We provide the first formal treatment of C3 services for different
settings, including exploration of their security requirements. A C3
service must provide secrecy of credentials provided by the client,
and ideally, it should also preserve secrecy of the leaked datasets
held by the C3 server. The computational and bandwidth overhead
for the client and especially the server should also be low. The
server might hold billions of leaked records, barring use of existing
cryptographic protocols for private set intersection (PSI) [29, 36],
which would use a prohibitive amount of bandwidth at this scale.
Current industry-deployed C3 services therefore reduce band-
width requirements by dividing the leaked data into buckets before
executing a PSI protocol. The client shares with the C3 server the
identifier of the bucket where their credentials would be found, if
present in the leak dataset. Then, the client and the server engage
in a protocol between the bucket held by the server and the cre-
dential held by the client to determine if their credential is indeed
in the leak. In current schemes, the prefix of the hash of the user
credential is used as the bucket identifier. The client shares the hash
prefix (bucket identifier) of their credentials with the C3 server.
Revealing hash prefixes of the credentials may be dangerous. We
outline an attack scenario against such prefix-revealing C3 services.
In particular, we consider a conservative setting where an attacker
obtains the hash prefix shared with the C3 server (possibly by
compromising the server) and also knows the username associated
with the queried credential. We rigorously evaluate the security of
HIBP and GPC under this threat model via a mixture of formal and
empirical analysis.
We start by considering users with a password appearing in
some leak and show how to adapt a recent state-of-the-art creden-
tial tweaking attack [40] to take advantage of the knowledge of
hash prefixes. In a credential tweaking attack, one uses the leaked
password to determine likely guesses (usually, small tweaks on
the leaked password). Via simulation, we show that our variant
of credential tweaking successfully compromises 80% of such ac-
counts within 1,000 guesses, given the transcript of a query made
to the HIBP server. This is 28% more than running the best known
credential tweaking attack, without knowledge of the transcript.
We also consider user accounts not present in a leak. Here we
found that the leakage from the hash prefix disproportionately
affects security compared to the previous case. For these user ac-
counts, obtaining the query to HIBP enables the attacker to guess
71% of passwords within 1,000 guesses, which is a 12x increase over
the success with no hash prefix information. Similarly, for GPC,
our simulation shows 34% of user passwords can be guessed in 10
or fewer attempts (and 61% in 1,000 attempts), should the attacker
learn the hash prefix shared with the GPC server.
The attack scenarios described are conservative because they
assume the attacker can infer which queries to the C3 server are
associated to which usernames. This may not be always possible.
Nevertheless, caution dictates that we would prefer schemes that
leak less. We therefore present two new C3 protocols, one that
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checks for leaked passwords (like HIBP) and one that checks for
leaked username-password pairs (like GPC). Like GPC and HIBP,
we partition the password space before performing PSI, but we do
so in a way that reduces leakage significantly.
Our first scheme works when only passwords are queried. It
utilizes a novel approach that we call frequency-smoothing bucke-
tization (FSB). The key idea is to use an estimate of the distribution
of human-chosen passwords to assign passwords to buckets in a
way that flattens the distribution of accessed buckets. We show
how to obtain good estimates (using leaked data), and, via simula-
tion, that FSB reduces leakage significantly. In many cases the best
attack given the information leaked by the C3 protocol works no
better than having no information at all. While the benefits come
with some added computational complexity and bandwidth, we
show via experimentation that the operational overhead for the
FSB C3 server or client is comparable with the overhead from GPC,
while also leaking much less information than hash prefix based
C3 protocols.
We also describe a more secure bucketizing scheme that pro-
vides better privacy/bandwidth tradeoff for C3 servers that store
username-password pairs. In fact this scheme was also (indepen-
dently) proposed in [44], and Google plans to transition to using
it in their extension. It is a simple modification of their current
protocol. We refer to it as IDB, ID-based bucketization, as it uses
the hash prefix of only the user identifier for bucketization (instead
of the hash prefix of the username-password pair as currently used
by GPC). Not having password information in the bucket identifier
hides the user’s password perfectly from an attacker who obtains
the client queries (assuming that passwords are independent of
usernames). We implement IDB and show that the average bucket
size in this setting for a hash prefix of 16 bits is similar to that of
GPC (around 9,166 entries per bucket).
Contributions. In summary, the main contributions of this paper
are the following:
• We provide a formalization of C3 protocols and detail the
security goals for such services.
• We discuss various threat models for C3 services, and ana-
lyze the security of two widely deployed C3 protocols. We
show that an attacker that learns the queries from a client
can severely damage the security of the client’s passwords,
should they also know the client’s username.
• We give a new C3 protocol (FSB) for checking only leaked
passwords that utilizes knowledge of the human-chosen
password distribution to reduce the leakage.
• We give a new C3 protocol for checking leaked username-
password pairs (IDB) that bucketizes using only usernames.
• We analyze the performance and security of both new C3
protocols to show feasibility in practice.
We will release as public, open source code our server and client
implementations of FSB and IDB.
2 OVERVIEW
We investigate approaches to checking credentials present in previ-
ous breaches. Several third party services provide credential check-
ing, enabling users and companies to mitigate credential stuffing
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Figure 1: A C3S service allows a client to ascertain whether a username
and password appear in public breaches known to the service.
and credential tweaking attacks [24, 40, 46], an increasingly daunt-
ing problem for account security.
To date, such C3 services have not received any analysis, and in-
deed their design rationale has only been discussed in blog posts [5,
43]. We start by describing the architecture of such services, and
then we detail relevant threat models.
C3 settings. We provide a diagrammatic summary of the abstract
architecture of C3 services in Figure 1. A C3 server has access to
a breach database 𝒮 . We can think of 𝒮 as a set of size N , which
consists of either a set of passwords {w1, . . . ,wN } or username-
password pairs {(u,w1), . . . , (u,wN )}. This corresponds to two
types of C3 services — password-only C3 service and username-
password C3 service. For example, HIBP [5] is a password-only C3
service,1 and Google’s service GPC [9] is an example of username-
password C3 service.
A client has as input a credential s = (u,w) and wants to deter-
mine if s is at risk due to exposure. The client and server therefore
engage in a set membership protocol to determine if s ∈ 𝒮 . Here,
clients can be users themselves (query C3 service using, say, a
browser extension), or other web services can query the C3 ser-
vice on behalf of their users. Of course, clients may make multiple
queries to the C3 service, though the number of queries might be
rate limited.
The ubiquity of breaches means that, nowadays, the breach data-
base 𝒮 will be quite large. A recently leaked compilation of previous
breached data contains 1.4 billion username password pairs [21].
The HIBP database has 501 million unique passwords [5]. Google’s
blog specifies that there are 4 billion username-password pairs in
their database of leaked credentials [43].
C3 protocols should be able to scale to handle set membership
requests for these huge datasets for millions of requests a day.
HIBP reported serving around 600,000 requests per day on average
[6]. The design of C3S should therefore not be computationally
expensive on the server-side. The number of network round trips
required must be low, and we will restrict attention to protocols
that can be completed with a single HTTPS request. Finally, we
will want to minimize bandwidth usage.
Threat model. Both the C3 server’s database 𝒮 and the client’s
queried password should be considered confidential.While breaches
1Actually HIBP also allows checking if a user identifier (email) is leaked with a data
breach. For the purpose of this study, however, we only focus on the above mentioned
two C3 services.
2
Credentials
checked
Name Bucket identifier B/w
(KB)
RTL
(ms)
Security
loss
Password HIBP 20-bits of SHA1(w ) 15.9 208 12x
FSB Figure 6, q¯ = 102 261 527 2x
(Username, GPC 16-bits of Argon2(u ∥w ) 606 458 10x
password) IDB 16-bits of Argon2(u) 606 487 1x
Figure 2: Comparison of different C3 protocols. HIBP [5] and GPC [9]
are two C3 services used in practice. We introduce frequency-smoothing
bucketization (FSB) and identifier-based bucketization (IDB). Security loss
is computed assuming query budget q = 103 for users who has not been
compromised before.
are often made public, we prefer to treat 𝒮 as confidential even if it
consists of only public information. Of course, by querying on 𝒮 a
malicious client will fundamentally be able to check if values are
in the database. Ideally such a brute-force approach would be the
best possible attack.
A malicious C3 server could deviate from its protocol, for ex-
ample, by lying to the client about the contents of 𝒮 in order to
encourage them to pick a weak password. Monitoring techniques
might be useful to catch such misdeeds. We do not consider active
attacks further, as we focus instead on the more pressing issue of
not leaking (u,w) to an honest-but-curious server that follows its
protocol but wants to infer information about the user’s password.
In our threat model we consider targeted attacks, where the
attacker has access to the username of the querying user. This is
realistic, as an attacker can learn the username corresponding to
a query by linking IP addresses to usernames. An attacker who
compromises the C3 server might be able to find the IP address of
the querying user. The attacker can send tracking emails to all the
leaked usernames present in the breach dataset. If a client clicks on
the link present in the email, the attacker would be able to retrieve
the IP address of the user [27]. Thereby, the attacker can associate
the email corresponding to the query to the C3 server.
For the rest of the paper, we will focus on this threat model where
the attacker knows the querying user’s username, and refer to it as
a known-username attack (KUA). The attacker can take advantage
of the leaked data to find (any) leaked passwords associated to the
target username and tailor its guesses based on them.
For this paper, we will focus on online attack settings, where the
attacker tries to impersonate a user by guessing their password for
other web services online. These are easy to launch and are one of
the most prevalent forms of attacks [16, 28]. However, in an online
setting, the web service can monitor the failed login attempts and
lock an account out after too many incorrect password submissions.
Therefore, the attacker gets only a small number of attempts, known
as the guessing budget q of the attack.
Potential approaches. A C3 protocol requires, at core, a secure
setmembership query. Existing protocols for private set intersection
(a generalization of set membership) [22, 31, 41, 42] cannot currently
scale to the set sizes required in C3 settings, N ≈ 230. For example,
the basic PSI protocol that uses an oblivious pseudorandom function
(OPRF) [31] computes yi = Fκ (ui ,wi ) for (ui ,wi ) ∈ 𝒮 where Fκ is
the secure OPRF with secret key κ (held by the server). It sends
all y1, . . . ,yN to the client, and the client obtains y = Fκ (u,w) for
its input (u,w) by obliviously computing it with the server. The
Symbol Description
u / 𝒰 user identifier, e.g. email / domain of users
w /𝒲 password / domain of passwords
𝒮 domain of credentials
?˜? set of leaked credentials
p distribution of username-password pairs over 𝒰 ×𝒲
pw distribution of passwords over𝒲
pˆs estimate of pw used by C3 server
q query budget of an attacker
q¯ parameter to FSB, estimated query budget of an attack
Figure 3: Descriptions of the notation used in the paper.
client can then check if y ∈ {y1, . . . ,yN }. But clearly for large N
this is prohibitively expensive in terms of bandwidth. One can use
Bloom filters to more compactly represent the set y1, . . . ,yN , but
the result is still too large. While more advanced PSI protocols exist
that improve on these results asymptotically, they are unfortunately
not yet practical for this C3 setting [30, 31].
Practical C3 schemes therefore relax the security requirements,
allowing the protocol to leak some information about the client’s
queried (u,w) but hopefully not too much. To date no one has inves-
tigated how damaging the leakage of currently proposed schemes is,
which we turn to doing next. In Figure 2, we show all the different
settings for C3 we discuss in the paper, and compare their security
and performance.
3 BUCKETIZATION SCHEMES AND
SECURITY MODELS
In this section we formalize the security models for a class of C3
schemes that bucketize the breach dataset into smaller sets (buckets).
Intuitively, a straightforward approach for checking whether or not
a client’s credentials are present in a large set of leaked credentials
hosted by a server is to divide the leaked data into various buckets.
The client and server can then perform a private set intersection
between the user’s credentials and one of the buckets (potentially)
containing that credential. The bucketization makes private set
membership tractable, while only leaking to the server that the
password may lie in the set associated to a certain bucket.
We give a general framework to understand the security loss
and bandwidth overhead of different bucketization schemes, which
we use to evaluate existing C3 services.
Notation. For ease of description of the constructions that follow,
we fix some notation. Let𝒲 be the set of all passwords, and pw
be the associated probability distribution; let 𝒰 be the set of all
user identifiers, and p be the joint distribution over 𝒰 ×𝒲 . We will
use 𝒮 to denote the domain of credentials being checked, i.e., for
password-only C3 service, 𝒮 =𝒲 , and for username-password C3
service, 𝒮 = 𝒰 ×𝒲 . Below we will use 𝒮 to give a generic scheme,
and specify the setting only if necessary to distinguish. Similarly,
s ∈ 𝒮 denotes a password or a username-password pair, based on
the setting. Let 𝒮 be the set of leaked credentials, and |𝒮 | = N .
Let H be a cryptographic hash function from {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}ℓ ,
where ℓ is a parameter to the system. We use ℬ to denote the
set of buckets, and we let β : 𝒮 7→ ℬ∗ \ {} be a bucketizing
function which maps a credential to a set of buckets. A credential
can be mapped to multiple buckets, and every credential is assigned
to at least one bucket. An inverse function to β is α : ℬ 7→ 𝒮∗,
3
Guess𝒜(q)
(u, w ) ←p 𝒰 ×𝒲
{w˜1, . . . , w˜q } ← 𝒜(u, q)
return w ∈ {w˜1, . . . , w˜q }
BucketGuess𝒜′β (q)
(u, w ) ←p 𝒰 ×𝒲 ; s ← (u, w )
h←$ β (s)
{w˜1, . . . , w˜q } ← 𝒜′(u, h, q)
return w ∈ {w˜1, . . . , w˜q }
Figure 4: The guessing games to evaluate security of different C3 schemes.
which maps a bucket to the set of all credentials it contains; so,
α(b) = {s ∈ 𝒮 b ∈ β(s)}. Note, α(b) can be very large given it
considers all credentials in 𝒮 . We let α˜ be the function that denotes
the credentials in the buckets held by the C3 server, α˜ (b) = α(b)∩𝒮 .
The client sendsb to the server, and then the client and the server
engage in a set intersection protocol between {s} and α˜ (b).
Bucketization schemes. Bucketization is dividing the credentials
held by the server into smaller buckets. The client can use the
bucketizing function β to find the set of buckets for a credential,
and then pick one randomly to query the server. There are different
ways to bucketize the credentials.
In the first method, which we call hash-prefix-based bucketiza-
tion (HPB), the credentials are partitioned based on the first l bits
of a cryptographic hash of the credentials. GPC [9] and HIBP [5]
APIs use HPB. The distribution of the credentials is not considered
in HPB, which causes it to incur higher security loss, as we show
in Section 4.
We introduce a new bucketizingmethod, whichwe call frequency-
smoothing bucketization (FSB), that takes into account the dis-
tribution of the credentials and replicates credentials into multi-
ple buckets if necessary. The replication “flattens” the conditional
distribution of passwords given a bucket identifier, and therefore
vastly reduces the security loss. We discuss FSB in more details in
Section 5.
In both HPB and FSB, the bucketization function depends on the
user’s password. We give another bucketization approach — the
most secure one — that bucketizes based only on the hash prefix of
the user identifier. We call this identifier-based bucketizing (IDB).
The approach is only applicable for username-password C3 services.
We discuss IDB in Section 4.
Security measure. The goal of an attacker is to learn the user’s
password. We will focus on online-guessing attacks, where an at-
tacker tries to guess a user’s password over the login interfaces
provided by a web service. An account might be locked for toomany
incorrect guesses (for example, 10), and the attack fails. Therefore,
we will measure an attacker’s success given a certain guessing bud-
get, say q. We will always assume the attacker has access to the
username of the target user.
The security games are given in Figure 4. The game Guess mod-
els the situation in which no information besides the username is re-
vealed to the adversary about the password. In the gameBucketGuess,
the adversary also gets access to a bucket that is chosen according
to the credentials s = (u,w) and the bucketization function β .
We define the advantage against a game as the maximum proba-
bility that the game outputs 1. Therefore,
Advgs(q) = max
𝒜
Pr
[
Guess𝒜(q) ⇒ 1
]
,
and
Advb-gsβ (q) = max𝒜′ Pr
[
BucketGuess𝒜
′
β (q) ⇒ 1
]
.
The probabilities are taken over the choices of username-password
pairs and the selection of bucket from the bucketizing function β .
Security loss, ∆β (q), of a bucketizing protocol β is defined as the
ratio of Advb-gsβ (q) over Advgs(q).
Note,
Pr
[
Guess𝒜(q) ⇒ 1
]
=
∑
u
Pr [w ∈ 𝒜(u,q) ∧U = u] .
To maximize this probability, the attacker must pick the q most
probable passwords for each user. Therefore,
Advgs(q) =
∑
u
max
w1, ...,wq
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi ∧U = u] . (1)
In BucketGuessβ , the attacker has access to the bucket identifier,
and therefore the advantage is computed as
Advb-gsβ (q)
=
∑
u
∑
b
max
w1, ...,wq
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi ∧U = u ∧ B = b]
=
∑
u
∑
b
max
(u,w1), ...,(u,wq )
∈α (b)
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi ∧U = u]
|β((u,wi ))|
The second equation follows because for b ∈ β((u,w)), each bucket
in β(w) is equally likely to be chosen, so
Pr [B = b | W = w ∧U = u] = 1|β((u,w))| .
The joint distribution of usernames and passwords is hard to
model. To simplify the equations, we divide the users targeted by
the attacker into two groups: compromised (users whose previously
compromised accounts are available to the attacker) and uncompro-
mised (users for which the attacker has no information other than
their usernames).
We assume the there is no direct correlation between the user-
name and password.2 Therefore, an attacker cannot use the knowl-
edge of only the username to tailor guesses. This means that in
the uncompromised setting, we assume Pr [W = w | U = u] =
Pr [W = w]. Assuming independence of usernames and passwords,
we define in the uncompromised setting
λq = Advgs(q) = maxw1, ...,wq
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi ] . (2)
We give analytical and empirical analysis of security in this
setting, and show that the security of uncompromised users is
impacted by existing C3 schemes much more than that of compro-
mised users.
In the compromised setting, the attacker can use the username
to find other leaked passwords associated with that user, which
then can be used to tailor guesses [40, 46]. Analytical bounds on
2Though prior work [33, 46] suggests knowledge of only username can improve
efficacy of guessing user passwords, the improvement is minimal. See Appendix A for
more on this analysis.
4
the compromised setting are less informative, so we evaluate this
setting empirically in Section 6.
Bandwidth. The bandwidth required for a bucketization scheme
is determined by the size of the buckets. The maximum size of the
buckets can be determined using a balls-and-bins approach [20],
assuming the client picks a bucket randomly from the possible set of
buckets β(s) for a credential s , and β(s) also maps s to a random set
of buckets. In totalm =
∑
s ∈?˜? |β(s)| credentials (balls) are “thrown”
into n = |ℬ | buckets. Ifm > |ℬ | · log |ℬ |, then following the seminal
results on balls-and-bins game [20], we can show the maximum
number of passwords in a bucket with very high probability 1−o(1)
is less than mn ·
(
1 +
√
n logn
m
)
≤ 2 · mn . We will use this formula to
compute an upper bound on the bandwidth requirement for specific
bucketization schemes.
4 HASH-PREFIX-BASED BUCKETIZATION
Hash-prefix-based bucketization (HPB) schemes are a simple ways
to divide the credentials stored by the C3 server. In this type of C3
scheme, a prefix of the hash of the credential is used as the criteria
to group the credentials into buckets — all credentials that share
the same hash-prefix are assigned to the same bucket. The total
number of buckets depends on l , the length the hash-prefix. The
number of credentials in the buckets depends on both l and |𝒮 |. We
will use H(l )(·) to denote the function that outputs the l-bit prefix
of the hash H(·). The client shares the hash prefix of the credential
they wish to check with the server. While a smaller hash prefix
reveals less information to the server about the user’s password, it
also increases the size of each bucket held by the server, which in
turn increases the communication overhead.
Hash-prefix-based bucketization is currently being used for cre-
dential checking in industry: HIBP [5] and GPC [9]. We introduce
a new HPB protocol called IDB that achieves zero security loss for
any query budget. Below we will discuss the design details of these
three C3 protocols.
HIBP [5]. HIBP uses HPB bucketization to provide a password-
only C3 service. They do not provide compromised username-
password checking. HIBPmaintains a database of leaked passwords,
which contains more than 501 million passwords [5]. They use the
SHA1 hash function, with prefix length l = 20; the leaked dataset is
partitioned into 220 buckets. The prefix length is chosen to ensure no
bucket is too small or too big. With l = 20, the smallest bucket has
381 passwords, and the maximum bucket has 584 passwords [19] .
This effectively makes the user’s password k-anonymous. However,
k-anonymity provides limited protection, as shown by numerous
prior works [35, 38, 49] and by our security evaluation.
The passwords are hashed using SHA1 and indexed by their hash
prefix for fast retrieval. A client computes the SHA1 hash of their
password w and queries HIBP with the 20-bit prefix of the hash;
the server responds with all the hashes that shares the same 20-bit
prefix. The client then checks if the full SHA1 hash ofw is present
among the set of hashes sent by the server. This is a weak form
of PSI that does not hide the leaked passwords from the client —
the client learns the SHA1 hash of the leaked passwords and can
perform brute force cracking to recover those passwords.
HIBP justifies this design choice by observing that passwords in
the server side leaked dataset are publicly available for download
on the Internet. Therefore, HIBP lets anyone download the hashed
passwords and usernames. This can be useful for parties who want
to host their own leak checking service without relying on HIBP.
However, keeping the leaked dataset up-to-date can be challenging,
making a third-party C3 service preferable.
HIBP trades server side privacy for protocol simplicity. The pro-
tocol also allows utilization of heavy caching on content delivery
networks (CDN), such as Cloudflare.3 The caching helps HIBP to
be able to serve 8 million requests a day with 99% cache hit rate (as
of August 2018) [18]. The human-chosen password distribution is
“heavy-headed”, that is a small number of passwords are chosen by
a large number of users. Therefore, a small number of passwords
are queried a large number of times, which in turn makes CDN
caching much more effective.
GPC [9]. Google provides a username-password C3S, called Pass-
word Checkup (GPC). The client — a browser extension — computes
the hash of the username and password together using the Argon2
hash function with the first l = 16 bits to determine the bucket iden-
tifier. After determining the bucket, the client engages in a private
set intersection (PSI) protocol with the server. The full algorithm is
given in Figure 5. GPC uses an OPRF-based PSI protocol. Let F(·)(·)
be a key-homomorphic pseudo-random function (PRF) such that
Fa (·) × Fb (·) = Fab (·). Under the hood, F calls the hash function
H on u∥w , and then maps the hash output onto the elliptic curve
point for further computation.
The server has a secret key κ which it uses to compute the
yi = Fκ (ui ∥wi ). The client shares with the server the bucket id b
and the PRF output of username-password pair x = Fr (u∥w), for
some randomly sampled r . The server returns the bucket zb =
{yi
H(ui ∥wi ) = b} and y = Fκ (x). Finally, the client completes
the OPRF computation by computing x˜ = F 1
r
(y) = Fκ (u∥w), and
checking if x˜ ∈ zb .
The GPC protocol is significantly more complex than HIBP, and
it does not allow easy caching by CDNs. However, it provides
secrecy of server side leaked data — the best case attack is to follow
the protocol to brute-force check if a password is present in the
leak database.
Bandwidth. HPB assigns every credential to only one bucket;
therefore, m =
∑
w ∈?˜? |β(w)| = |𝒮 | = N . The total number of
buckets n = 2l . Following the discussion from Section 3, maximum
bandwidth for a HPB C3S should be no more than 2 · mn = 2 · N2l .
We experimentally verified the bandwidth value, and the sizes
of the buckets for HIBP, GPC, and IDB are given in Section 7.
Security. HPB schemes like HIBP and GPC expose a prefix of
the user’s password (or username-password pair) to the server. As
discussed earlier, we assume the attacker knows the username of
the target user. In the uncompromised setting — where the user
identifier does not appear in the leaked data available to the attacker,
we show that giving the attacker the hash-prefix with a guessing
budget of q queries is equivalent to giving as many as q · |ℬ | queries
(with no hash-prefix) to the attacker.
3https://www.cloudflare.com/
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Precomputation by C3 Server
Let ?˜? = {(u1, w1), . . . , (uN , wN )}
∀j ∈ [0, . . . , 2l − 1]
zj ←
{
Fκ (ui ∥wi )
H(l )(u ∥w ) = j)}
zj ←
{
Fκ (ui ∥wi )
H(l )(u) = j)}
Client C3 server
Input: (u, w ) Input: κ, z
r ←$ Zq
x ← Fr (u ∥w )
b ← H(l )(u ∥w )
b ← H(l )(u) x,b−−−−−−−→
y,zb←−−−−−−−− y = Fκ (x )
x˜ ← F 1
r
(y)
Return x˜ ∈ zb
Figure 5: Algorithms for GPC, and the change in IDB given in the box.
F(·)(·) is a PRF.
Theorem 4.1. Let βHPB : 𝒮 7→ ℬ be the bucketization scheme
that, for a credential s ∈ 𝒮 , chooses a bucket that is a function of
H(l )(s), where s contains the user’s password. The advantage of an
attacker in this setting against previously uncompromised users is
Advb-gsβHPB (q) ≤ Adv
gs(q · |ℬ |) .
Proof: First, note that |βHPB(·)| = 1, as every password is as-
signed to exactly one of the buckets. Following the discussion
from Section 3, assuming independence of usernames and pass-
words in the uncompromised setting, we can compute the advan-
tage against game BucketGuess as,
Advb-gsβHPB (q) =
∑
b ∈ℬ
max
w1, ...,wq
∈α (b)
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi ] ≤ Advgs(q · |ℬ |)
We relax the α(b) notation to denote set of passwords (instead of
username-password pairs) assigned to a bucket b. The inequality
follows from the fact that each password is present in only one
bucket. If we sum up the probabilities of the top q passwords in
each bucket, the result will be at most the sum of the probabilities
of the top q · |ℬ | passwords. Therefore, the maximum advantage
achievable is Advgs(q · |ℬ |).
Theorem 4.1 only provides an upper bound on the security loss.
Moreover, for the compromised setting, the analytical formula is
less informative. So, we use empiricism to find the effective security
loss against compromised and uncompromised users. We report
all security simulation results in Section 6. Notably, with GPC with
hash prefix length l = 16, an attacker can guess passwords of 60.5%
of (previously uncompromised) user accounts in fewer than 1000
guesses, a 10x increase from the percent it can compromise without
access to the hash prefix. (See Section 6 for more results.)
Identifier-based bucketization (IDB). As our security analysis
and simulation show, the security degradation of HPB is dismal.
The main issue with those protocols is that the bucket identifier is
a deterministic function of the user password. We give a new C3
protocol that uses HPB style bucketing based on only username.
We call this identifier-based bucketization (IDB). IDB is defined for
username-password C3 schemes.
IDB is a slight modification of the protocol used by GPC—we use
the hash-prefix of the username, H(l )(u), instead of the hash-prefix
of the username-password combination, H(l )(u ∥w), as a bucket
identifier. The scheme is described in Figure 5, using the changes
in the boxed code. The bucket identifier is computed completely
independent of the password (assuming username is independent of
the password). Therefore, the attacker gets no additional advantage
for knowing the bucket identifier.
Because IDB uses the hash-prefix of the username as the bucket
identifier, two hash computations are required on the client side
for each query (as opposed to one for GPC). With most modern
devices, this is not a significant computing burden, but the protocol
latency may be impacted, since we use a slow hash (Argon2). We
show experimentally how the extra hash computation affects the
latency of IDB in Section 7.
Since IDB does not use the user’s password to determine the
bucket identifier, there is no security loss.
Theorem 4.2. With the IDB protocol, for all q ≥ 0
Advb-gsIDB (q) = Advgs(q).
We provide the proof of this theorem in Appendix C. Because
the bucket identifiers are chosen independent of the passwords, the
conditional probability of the password given the bucket identifier
remains the same as the probability without knowing the bucket
identifier.
Overall, we can use a form of HPB to create a username-password
C3S scheme with no security loss, but the password-only C3S
schemes constructed using HPB lead to significant security loss.
In the next section we solve this problem by introducing a more
secure password-only C3S scheme.
5 FREQUENCY-SMOOTHING
BUCKETIZATION
In the previous section we show how to build a username-password
C3 service that does not degrade security. However, many services,
such as HIBP, only provide a password-only C3 service. HIBP does
not store username-password pairs so, should the HIBP server ever
get compromised, an attacker cannot use their leak database to
mount credential stuffing attacks. Moreover, IDB cannot be ex-
tended in any useful way to protect password-only C3 services.
Therefore, we introduce a new bucketization scheme to build
secure password-only C3 services. We call this scheme frequency-
smoothing bucketization (FSB). FSB assigns a password to multiple
buckets based on its probability — frequent passwords are assigned
to many buckets. Replicating a password into multiple buckets effec-
tively reduces the conditional probabilities of that password given
a bucket identifier. We do so in a way that makes the conditional
probabilities of popular passwords similar to those of unpopular
passwords to make it harder for the attacker to guess the correct
password. FSB, however, is only effective for non-uniform creden-
tial distributions, such as password distributions.4 Therefore, FSB
4Usernames (e.g., emails) are unique for each users, so the distribution of usernames
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βFSB(w ) :
γ ← min
{
|ℬ |,
⌈ |ℬ|·pˆs (w )
pˆs (wq¯ )
⌉}
s ← f (w )
If s + γ < |ℬ | then
r ← [s, s + γ − 1]
Else
r ← [0, s + γ − 1 mod |ℬ |]
r ← r ∪ [s, |ℬ | − 1]
Return r
α˜FSB(b) :
/* returns {w ∈ ?˜? b ∈ β (w )} */
A←𝒲q¯
Forw ∈ ?˜? \𝒲q¯ do
If b ∈ βFSB(w ) then
A← A ∪ {w }
return A
Figure 6: Bucketizing function βFSB for assigning passwords to buckets
in FSB. Here pˆs is the distribution of passwords;𝒲q¯ is the set of top-q¯
passwords according to pˆs ; ℬ is the set of buckets; f is a universal hash
function f : W 7→ Z|B | ; 𝒮 is the set of passwords hosted by the server.
cannot be used to build a username-password C3 service.
Implementing FSB requires knowledge of the distribution of
human-chosen passwords. Of course, obtaining precise knowledge
of the password distribution can be difficult; therefore, we will
use an estimated password distribution, denoted by pˆs . Another
parameter of FSB is q¯, which is an estimate of the attacker’s query
budget. We show that if the actual query budget q ≤ q¯, FSB has
zero security loss. Larger q¯ will provide better security; however,
it also means more replication of the passwords and larger bucket
sizes. So, q¯ can be tuned to balance between security and bandwidth.
Below we will give the two main algorithms of FSB scheme: βFSB
and α˜FSB, followed by bandwidth and security analysis for FSB.
Bucketizing function (βFSB). To map passwords to buckets, we
use a universal hash function f : 𝒲 7→ Z |B | . The algorithm for
bucketization βFSB(w) is given in Figure 6. The parameter q¯ is used
in the following way: β replicates the most probable q¯ passwords,
𝒲q¯ , across all |ℬ | buckets. Each of the remaining passwords are
replicated proportional to their probability. A passwordw with prob-
ability pˆs (w) is replicated exactly γ =
⌈ |ℬ | ·pˆs (w )
pˆs (wq¯ )
⌉
times, wherewq¯
is the q¯th most likely password. Exactly which buckets a password
is assigned to are determined using the universal hash function f .
Each bucket is assigned an identifier between [0, |ℬ | − 1]. A pass-
wordw is assigned to the buckets whose identifiers fall in the range
[f (w), f (w) + γ − 1]. The range can wrap around. For example, if
f (w)+γ > |ℬ |, then the password is assigned to the buckets in the
range [0, f (w) + γ − 1 mod |ℬ |] and [f (w), |ℬ | − 1].
Bucket retrieving function (α˜ ). Retrieving passwords assigned
to a bucket is challenging in FSB. An inefficient — linear in N —
implementation of α˜ is given in Figure 6. Storing the contents of
each bucket separately is not feasible, since the number of buckets
in FSB can be very large, |ℬ | ≈ N . To solve the problem, we utilize
the structure of the bucketizing procedure where passwords are
assigned to buckets in continuous intervals. This allows us to use
an interval tree [7] data structure to store the intervals for all of the
passwords. Interval trees allow fast queries to retrieve the set of
intervals that contain a queried point (or interval) — exactly what
is needed to instantiate α˜ .
This efficiency comes with increased storage cost. To store N en-
tries in a interval tree, we require𝒪 (N logN ) storage. The tree can
be built in𝒪 (N logN ) time, and each query takes𝒪 (logN + |α˜ (b)| )
and username-password pairs are close to uniform.
time. The big-O notation only hides small constants.
Estimating password distributions. To construct the bucketiza-
tion algorithm for FSB, the server needs an estimate of the password
distribution (pw ). This estimate will be used by both the server and
the client to assign passwords to buckets. One possible estimate is
the histogram of the passwords in the leaked data 𝒮 . Histogram
estimates are typically accurate for popular passwords, but such
estimates are not complete — passwords that are not in the leaked
dataset will have zero probability according to this estimate. More-
over, sending the histogram over to the client is expensive in terms
of bandwidth and security critical. We also considered password
strength meters, such as zxcvbn [47] as a proxy for a probability
estimate. However, this estimate turned out to be too coarse for our
purposes. For example, more than 105 passwords had a “probability”
of greater than 10−3.
We build a 3-gram password model pˆn using the leaked pass-
words present in 𝒮 . Markov models or n-gram models are shown
to be effective at estimating human-chosen password distribu-
tions [34], and they are very fast to train and run (unlike neu-
ral network based password distribution estimators, such as [37]).
However, we found the n-gram model assigns very low probabili-
ties to popular passwords. The sum of the probabilities of the top
1,000 passwords as estimated by the 3-gram model is only 0.0012,
whereas in practice the top 1000 passwords are chosen by 5.6% of
users.
We therefore use a combined approach that uses a histogram
model for the popular passwords and the 3-gram model for the
rest of the distribution. Such combined techniques are also used
in practice for password strength estimation [37, 47]. Let pˆs be
the estimated password distribution used by FSB. Let pˆh be the
distribution of passwords implied by the histogram of passwords
present in 𝒮 . Let 𝒮t be the set of the t most probable passwords
according to pˆh . We used t = 106.
pˆs (w) =

pˆh (w) ifw ∈ 𝒮t ,
pˆn (w) ·
1−∑w˜∈?˜?t pˆh (w )
1−∑w˜∈?˜?t pˆn (w ) otherwise.
Bandwidth. We use the formulation provided in Section 3 to
compute the bandwidth requirement for FSB. In this case, m =
|ℬ | · q¯ + |ℬ |pˆs (wq¯ ) + N , and n = |ℬ |. Therefore, the maximum size of
a bucket is with high probability less than 2 ·
(
q¯ + 1pˆs (wq¯ ) +
N
|ℬ |
)
.
The details of this analysis are given in Appendix B.
In practice, we can choose the number of buckets to be such
that |ℬ | = N . Then, the number of passwords in a bucket depends
primarily on the parameter q¯. Note, bucket size increases with q¯.
Security analysis. We show that there is no security loss in the
uncompromised setting for FSB when the actual number of guesses
q is less than the parameter q¯, and we give an upper bound for the
security loss when q exceeds q¯.
Theorem 5.1. If a frequency based bucketization scheme ensures
∀w ∈ 𝒲, |βFSB(w)| = min
{
|ℬ |,
⌈ |ℬ | ·pˆs (w )
pˆs (wq¯ )
⌉}
, then for the uncom-
promised users,
(1) Advb-gsβFSB (q) = Adv
gs(q) for q ≤ q¯, and
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(2) for q > q¯ ,
λq − λq¯
2 ≤ ∆q ≤ (q − q¯) · pˆs (wq¯ ) − (λq − λq¯ )
The full proof is included in Appendix D. Intuitively, since the
top q passwords are repeated across all buckets, having a bucket
identifier does not allow an attacker to easily guess these q pass-
words. Moreover, the conditional probability of these q passwords
given the bucket is greater than that of any other password in the
bucket. Therefore, the attacker’s best choice is to guess the top q
passwords, meaning that it does not get any additional advantage
when q¯ ≤ q, leading to part (1) of the theorem.
The proof of part (2) follows from the upper and lower bounds
on the number of buckets each password beyond the top q is placed
within. The bounds we prove show that the additional advantage
in guessing the password in q queries is less than the number of
additional queries times the probability of the q¯th password and
at least half the difference in the guessing probabilities λq and λq¯
(defined in Equation (2)).
Note that this analysis of security loss is based on the assumption
that the FSB scheme has access to the precise password distribution,
pˆs = pw . We empirically analyze the security loss in Section 6 for
pˆs , pw , in both the compromised and uncompromised settings.
6 EMPIRICAL SECURITY EVALUATION
In this sectionwe empirically evaluate and compare the security loss
for different password-only C3 schemes we have discussed so far —
hash-prefix-based bucketization (HPB) and frequency-smoothing
bucketization (FSB).
We focus on known-username attacks (KUA), since in many
deployment settings a curious (or compromised) C3 server can
figure out the username of the querying user. We separate our
analysis into two settings: previously compromised users, where the
attacker has access to one or more existing passwords of the target
user, and previously uncompromised users, where no password
corresponding to the user is known to the attacker (or present in
the breached data).
Recall, according to our threat model, we assume the adversary
has knowledge of all the leak dataset C3 is using. This situation is
realistic, since many password breaches are readily available for
download online. For each setting the attacker also knows the buck-
etizing algorithm. The attacker obtains (possibly by compromising
the C3 service) the bucket identifier that the client queried, as well
as the user’s username or email. Our analysis will also show what
an honest-but-curious C3 server would learn about the passwords
of a user who participated in the protocol.
First wewill look into the unrestricted settingwhere no password
policy is enforced, and the attacker and the C3 server have the
same amount of information about the password distribution. In
the second experiment, we analyze the effect on security of giving
the attacker more information compared to the C3 server (defender)
by having a password policy that the attacker is aware of but the
C3 server is not.
Password breachdataset. Weused the breach dataset used in [40].
The dataset was derived from a previous breach compilation [21]
?˜? T T ∩ ?˜? Tsp Tsp ∩ ?˜?
# users 383.2 7.5 5.6 (76%) 4.8 3.7 (77%)
# passwords 255.2 5.4 3.6 (67%) 4.0 2.4 (60%)
# user-pw pairs 748.9 7.5 2.8 (37%) 4.9 1.8 (37%)
Figure 7: Number of entries (in millions) in the breach dataset 𝒮 , test
dataset T , and the site-policy test subset Tsp. Also reported are the intersec-
tions (of users, passwords, and user-password pairs, separately) between
the test dataset entries and the whole breach dataset that the attacker has
access to. The percentage values refer to the fraction of the values in each
test set that also appear in the intersections.
dataset containing about 1.4 billion username-password pairs. The
data was cleaned by removing non-ASCII characters and passwords
longer than 30 characters. The authors of [40] also joined accounts
with similar usernames and passwords using a method they called
the mixed method. The usernames with only one email and pass-
word were removed, which in total removed 650 million username-
password pairs. We obtained this joined and filtered dataset from
the authors and performed our empirical analysis on that dataset.
Removal of the 650 million pairs for users with only one password
can only affect the experiment on the security for uncompromised
users. Given the large size of the dataset, we expect our results
on attack success are not impacted in any significant way by the
removal of those accounts.
The final dataset consists of about 756million username-password
pairs.5 We remove 1% of username-password pairs to use as test
data, denoted as T . The remaining 99% of the data is used to simu-
late the database of leaked credentials 𝒮 . For the experiments with
an enforced password policy, we took the username-password pairs
inT that met the requirements of the password policy to createTsp.
We use Tsp to simulate queries from a website which only allows
passwords that are at least 8 characters long and are not present in
Twitter’s list of banned passwords [11]. For all attack simulations,
the target user-password pairs are sampled from the test dataset T
(or Tsp).
In Figure 7, we report some statistics about T , Tsp, and 𝒮 . No-
tably, 5.6 million (76%) of the users in T are also present in 𝒮 . This
is likely because users in the joined breach compilation dataset
have at least two passwords. If the 650 million singleton users had
not been removed, we expect that this number would be smaller.
Among the username-password pairs, 2.8 million (37%) pairs in
T are also present in 𝒮 . This means an attacker will be able to
compromise 37% of the accounts (which is 50% of the previously
compromised accounts) trivially with credential stuffing. In the
site-policy enforced test data Tsp, a similar proportion of the users
(77%) and username-password pairs (37%) are also present in 𝒮 .
Experiment setup. We want to understand the impact of reveal-
ing a bucket identifier on the security of uncompromised and com-
promised users separately. As we can see from Figure 7, a large
proportion of users in T are also present in 𝒮 . We therefore split T
into two parts: one with only username-password pairs from com-
promised users, Tcomp (users with at least one password present
in 𝒮), and another with only pairs from uncompromised users
5Note, there are duplicate username-password pairs in this dataset.
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Tuncomp. We take two sets of random samples of 5000 username-
password pairs6, one from Tcomp, and another from Tuncomp. For
each pair (u,w), we run the gamesGuess and BucketGuess as spec-
ified in Figure 4. We record the results for guessing budgets of
q ∈ {1, 10, 102, 103}. We repeat each of the experiments 5 times
and report the averages in Figure 8.
For HPB, we compared implementations using hash prefixes of
lengths l ∈ {12, 16, 20}. We use the SHA256 hash function with a
salt, though the choice of hash function does not have a noticeable
impact on the results.
For FSB, we used interval tree data structures to store the leaked
passwords in 𝒮 for fast retrieval of α˜ (b). We used |ℬ | = 230 buckets
and the hash function f is set to f (x) = H(30)(x), the 30-bit prefix
of the (salted) SHA256 hash of the password.
Attack strategy. The attacker’s goal is to maximize its success in
winning the games Guess and BucketGuess. In Equation (1) and
Equation (2) we outline the advantage of attackers against Guess
and BucketGuess, and thereby specify the best strategies for at-
tacks. Guess denotes the baseline attack success rate in a scenario
where the attacker does not have access to bucket identifiers corre-
sponding to users’ passwords. Therefore the best strategy for the
attacker 𝒜 is to output the q most probable passwords according
to its best knowledge of the password distribution.
The optimal attack strategy for 𝒜′ in BucketGuess will be to
find a list of passwords according to the following equation,
argmax
w1, ...,wq
b ∈β ((u,wi ))
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi | U = u]
|β((u,wi ))| ,
where the bucket identifier b and user identifier u are provided to
the attacker. This is equivalent to taking the top-q passwords in the
set α(b) ordered by Pr [W = w | U = u] /|β((u,w))|.
We compute the list of guesses outputted by the attacker for a
user u and bucket b in the following way. For the compromised
users, i.e., if (u, ·) ∈ 𝒮 , the attacker first considers the list of 104
targeted guesses generated based on the credential tweaking attack
introduced in [40]. If any of these passwords belong to α(b) they
are guessed first. This step is skipped for uncompromised users.
For the remaining guesses, we first construct a list of candidates
L. L consists of the 106 most frequent passwords in 𝒮 and 500× 106
passwords generated from the 3-gram password distribution model
pˆn . Each password w in L is assigned a weight pˆs (w)/|β((u,w))|
(See Section 5 for details on pˆs and pˆn ). The list L is pruned to
only contain unique guesses. Note L is constructed independent
of the username or bucket identifier, and it is reordered based
on the weight values. Therefore, it is constructed once for each
bucketization strategy. Finally, based on the bucket identifier b,
the remaining guesses are chosen from {α(b) ∩ (u,w) | w ∈ L} in
descending order of weight.
For the HPB implementation, each password is mapped to one
bucket, so |β(w)| = 1 for all w . For FSB, |β(·)| can be calculated
using the equation in Theorem 5.1.
Results. We report the success rates of the attack simulations
6There was a low standard deviation between results for different random samples of
5000 pairs.
in Figure 8. The baseline success rate (first row) is the advantage
Advgs, computed using the same attack strategy stated above except
with no information about the bucket identifier. The following
rows record the success rate of the attack for HPB and FSB with
different parameter choices. The estimated security loss (∆q ) can
be calculated by subtracting the baseline success rate from the HPB
and FSB attack success rates.
The security loss from using HPB is devastating, especially for
previously uncompromised users. Accessibility to the l = 20-bit
hash prefix, used by HIBP [5], allows an attacker to compromise
34% of previously uncompromised users in just one guess. In fewer
than 103 guesses, that attacker can compromise more than 70%
of the accounts (12x more than the baseline success rate with
103 guesses). Google Password Checker (GPC) uses l = 16 for
its username-password C3 service. Against GPC, an attacker only
needs 10 guesses per account to compromise 34% of accounts. Re-
ducing the prefix length l can decrease the attacker’s advantage.
However, that would also increase the bucket size. As we see for
l = 12, the average bucket size is 62,309, so the bandwidth required
to perform the credential check would be high.
FSB resists guessing attacks much better than HPB does. For q ≤
q¯ the attacker gets no additional advantage, even with the estimated
password distribution pˆs . The security loss for FSB when q > q¯ is
much smaller than that of HPB, even with smaller bucket sizes. For
example, the additional advantage over the baseline against FSB
with q = 100 and q¯ = 10 is only 3%, despite FSB also having smaller
bucket sizes than HPB with l = 16. Similarly for q¯ = 100, ∆103 =
3.6%. This is because the conditional distribution of passwords
given an FSB bucket identifier is nearly uniform, making it harder
for an attacker to guess the correct password in the bucket α(b) in
q guesses.
For previously compromised users — users present in 𝒮 — even
the baseline success rate is very high: 37% of account passwords
can be guessed in 1 guess and 53% can be guessed in fewer than
1,000 guesses. The advantage is supplemented even further with
access to the hash prefix. As per the guessing strategy, the attacker
first guesses the leaked passwords that are both associated to the
user and in α(b). This turns out to be very effective. Due to the
high baseline success rate the relative increase is low; nevertheless,
in total, an attacker can guess the passwords of 80% of previously
compromised users in fewer than 1,000 guesses. For FSB, the secu-
rity loss for compromised users is comparable to the loss against
uncompromised users for q ≤ q¯. Particularly for q¯ = 10 and q = 100,
the attacker’s additional success is only 1.9%. Similarly, for q¯ = 100
an attacker gets at most 2.1% additional advantage for a guessing
budget of q=1,000. Interestingly, FSB performs significantly worse
for compromised users compared to uncompromised users forq = 1.
This is because the FSB bucketing strategy does not take into ac-
count targeted password distributions, and the first guess in the
compromised setting is based on the credential tweaking attack.
In our simulation, previously compromised usersmade up around
76% of the test set; it is unclear what is the actual proportion would
be in the real world, so we do not combine results from the uncom-
promised and compromised settings.
As we can see, since the bucket sizes for FSB with q¯ = 100
and HPB with l = 16 are comparable, we will use q¯ = 100 as the
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Protocol Params Bucket size Uncompromised CompromisedAvg max q = 1 q = 10 q = 102 q = 103 q = 1 q = 10 q = 102 q = 103
Baseline N/A N/A N/A 0.6 1.3 2.5 5.9 37.4 50.4 51.4 52.6
HPB
l = 20‡ 244 303 33.7 49.7 63.0 71.0 64.9 71.8 76.6 79.9
l = 16† 3,896 4,138 18.3 34.3 47.6 60.5 58.2 65.0 71.1 75.7
l = 12 62,309 63,173 8.4 18.0 31.6 45.1 53.5 58.2 63.9 70.0
FSB
q¯ = 1 76 112 0.6 5.7 69.9 71.0 51.3 53.3 79.4 79.9
q¯ = 10 908 1,010 0.6 1.3 5.5 70.0 51.1 51.6 53.3 79.5
q¯ = 102 5,635 5,876 0.6 1.3 2.5 9.4 50.7 51.5 52.1 54.7
q¯ = 103 21,107 21,550 0.6 1.3 2.5 5.8 50.4 51.5 52.1 53.3
‡ HIBP uses l = 20 for its password-only C3 service. † GPC uses l = 16 for username-password C3 service.
Figure 8: Comparison of attack success rate given q queries on different password-only C3 settings. All success rates are in percent (%) of the total number
of samples (5,000). Bucket size, the number of passwords associated to a bucket, is measured on a random sample of 10,000 buckets.
parameter for FSB for further security and performance analysis.
Note, GPC has a username-password C3 service and therefore, its
bucket sizes will be larger. (See Figure 10.)
Password policy experiment. In the previous set of experiments,
we assumed that the C3 server and the attacker use the same es-
timate of the password distribution. To simulate the effect when
the attacker has a better estimate of the password distribution than
the C3 server, we simulated a website which enforces a password
policy. We assume that the policy is known to the attacker but not
to the C3 server.
For our sample password policy, we required that passwords
have at least 8 characters and that they must not be on Twitter’s
banned password list [11]. The test samples are drawn from Tsp,
username-password pairs from T where passwords follow this pol-
icy, and the attacker is also given the ability to tailor their guesses
to this policy. The server still stores all passwords in 𝒮 , without
regard to this policy. Notably, the FSB scheme relies on a good
estimate of the password distribution to be effective in distributing
passwords evenly across buckets. Its estimate, when compared to
the distribution of passwords in Tsp, should be less accurate than
it was in the regular simulation, when compared to the password
distribution from T .
We chose the parameters k = 16 for HPB and q¯ = 100 for FSB,
because they were the most representative of how the HPB and FSB
bucketization schemes compare to each other. These parameters
also lead to similar bucket sizes, with around 5,000 passwords per
bucket. Overall, we see that the success rate of an attacker decreases
in this simulation compared to the general experiment (without a
password policy). This is likely due to the fact that after removing
popular passwords, the remaining set of passwords that we can
choose from has higher entropy, and each password is harder to
guess. FSB still defends much better against the attack than HPB
does, even though the password distribution estimate used by the
FSB implementation is quite inaccurate, especially at the head of the
distribution. FSB assigns larger probability estimates to passwords
that are banned according to our password policy.
We also see that due to the inaccurate estimate by the C3 server
for FSB, we start to see some security loss for an adversary with
guessing budget q = 100. In the general simulation, the password
estimate pˆs used by the server was closer to p, so we didn’t have
any noticeable security loss where q ≤ q¯.
Protocol Uncompromised Compromised
q = 1 10 102 103 q = 1 10 102 103
Baseline 0.1 0.4 1.2 3.1 37.9 46.7 47.0 47.8
HPB (l = 16) 9.6 17.8 27.0 41.2 51.0 55.7 59.5 63.8
FSB (q¯ = 102) 0.1 0.4 1.4 9.6 46.8 47.1 47.3 51.2
Figure 9: Attack success rate (in %) comparison for HPB with l = 16
(effectively GPC) and FSB with q¯ = 102 for password policy simulation.
The first row records the baseline success rate Advgs(q). There were 5,000
samples each from the uncompromised and compromised settings.
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we implement different approaches to checking com-
promised credentials and evaluate their computational overheads.
For fair comparison, in addition to the algorithms we propose, FSB
and IDB, we also implement HIBP and GPCwith our breach dataset.
Setup. We build C3 services as serverless web applications that pro-
vide REST APIs. We used AWS Lambda [1] for the server-side com-
putation and Amazon DynamoDB [3] to store the data. The benefit
of using AWS Lambda is it can be easily deployed as Lambda@Edge
and integrated with Amazon’s content delivery network (CDN),
called CloudFront [2]. (HIBP uses Cloudflare as CDN to serve more
than 600,000 requests per day [6].) We used Javascript to implement
the server and the client side functionalities. The server is imple-
mented as a Node-JS app. We provisioned the Lambda workers to
have maximum 3GB of memory. For cryptographic operations, we
used a Node-JS library called Crypto [12].
For pre-processing and pre-computation of the data we used a
desktop with an Intel Core i9 processor and 128 GB RAM. Though
some of the computation (e.g., hash computations) can be expedited
using GPUs, we did not use any for our experiment. We used the
same machine to act as the client. The round trip network latency
of the Lambda API from the client machine takes about 130 millisec-
onds. Recall that the breach dataset we use contains 255 million
unique passwords and 749 million unique username-password pairs.
(See Figure 7.)
To measure the performance of each scheme, we pick 20 random
passwords from the test setT and run the full C3 protocol with each
one. We report the average time taken for each run in Figure 10.
In the figure, we also give the break down of the time taken by
the server and the client for different operations. The network
latency had very high standard deviation (25%), though all other
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measurements had low (< 1%) standard deviation compared to the
mean.
HIBP. The implementation of HIBP is the simplest among the four
schemes. The set of passwords in 𝒮 is hashed using SHA256 and
split into 220 buckets based on the first 20 bits of the hash value (we
picked SHA256 because we also used the same for FSB). Because the
bucket sizes in HIBP are so small (< 500), each bucket is stored as a
single value in a DynamoDB cell, where the key is the hash prefix.
For larger leaked datasets, each bucket can be split into multiple
cells. The client sends the 20 bit prefix of the SHA256 hash of their
password, and the server responds with the corresponding bucket.
Among all the protocols HIBP is the fastest (but also weakest in
terms of security). It takes only 208 ms on average to complete a
query over WAN. Most of the time is spent in round-trip network
latency and the query to DynamoDB. The only cryptographic op-
eration on the client side is a SHA256 hash of the password, which
takes less than 1 ms.
FSB. The implementation of FSB is more complicated than that
of HIBP. Because we have more than 1 billion buckets for FSB and
each password is replicated in potentially many buckets, storing all
the buckets explicitly would require too much storage overhead. We
use interval trees [7] to quickly recover the passwords in a bucket
without explicitly storing each bucket. Each password w in the
breach database is represented as an interval specified by βFSB(w).
We stored each node of the tree as a separate cell in DynamoDB. We
retrieved the intervals (passwords) intersecting a particular value
(bucket identifier) by querying the nodes stored in DynamoDB.
FSB also needs an estimate of the password distribution to get the
interval range for a tree. We use pˆs as described in Section 4. The
description of pˆs takes 8.9 MB of space that needs to be included
as part of the client side code. This is only a one-time cost during
client installation.
The depth of the interval tree is logN , where N is the number of
intervals (passwords) in the tree. Since each node in the tree is stored
as a separate key-value pair in the database, one client query re-
quires logN queries to DynamoDB. To reduce this cost, we split the
interval tree into r trees over different ranges of intervals, such that
the i-th tree is over the interval [(i − 1) · ⌊|ℬ |/r⌋ , i · ⌊|ℬ |/r⌋ − 1].
The passwords whose bucket intervals span across multiple ranges
are present in all corresponding trees. We used r = 64, as it ensures
each tree has around 4 million passwords, and the total storage
overhead is less than 1% more than if we stored one large tree.
Each interval tree of 4 million passwords was generated in paral-
lel and took 3 hours in our server. Each interval tree takes 400 MB
of storage in DynamoDB, and in total 25 GB of space. FSB is the
slowest among all the protocols, mainly due to multiple DynamoDB
calls, which cumulatively take 273 ms (half of the total time, in-
cluding network latency). This can be sped up by using a better
implementation of interval trees on top of DynamoDB, such as
storing a whole subtree in a DynamoDB cell instead of storing each
tree node separately. We can also split the range of the range tree
into more granular intervals to reduce each tree size. Nevertheless,
as the round trip time for FSB is small (527 ms), we leave such
optimization for future work. The maximum amount of memory
used by the server is less than 81 MB during an API call.
On the client side, the computational overhead is minimal. The
Protocol Client Server Total BucketCrypto Server call Comp DB call Crypto time size
HIBP 1 205 2 40 – 208 244
FSB 1 524 2 273 – 527 3,086
GPC 47 402 9 71 6 458 9,164
IDB 72 405 10 73 6 487 9,166
Figure 10: Time taken in milliseconds to make a C3 API call. The client
and server columns contain the time taken to perform client side and server
side operations respectively.
client performs one SHA256 hash computation. The network band-
width consumed for sending the bucket of hash values from the
server takes on average 261 KB.
IDB and GPC. Implementations of IDB and GPC are very similar.
We used the same platform — AWS Lambda and DynamoDB — to
implement these two schemes. All the hash computations used
here are Argon2id with default parameters, since GPC in [9] uses
Argon2. During precomputation, the server computes the Argon2
hash of each username-password pair and raises it to the power
of the server’s key κ. These values can be further (fast) hashed
to reduce their representation size, which saves disk space and
bandwidth. However, hashing would make it difficult to rotate
server key. We therefore store the exponentiated Argon2 hash
values in the database, and hash them further during the online
phase of the protocol. The hash values are indexed and bucketized
based on either H(l )(u∥w) (for GPC) or H(l )(u) (for IDB). We used
l = 16 for both GPC and IDB, as proposed in [9].
The server (for both IDB and GPC) only performs one elliptic
curve exponentiation, which on average takes 6 ms. The remain-
ing time incurred is from network latency and calling Amazon
DynamoDB.
On the client side, one Argon2 hash has to be computed for GPC
and two for IDB. Computing the Argon2 hash of the username-
password pairs takes on an average 20 ms on the desktop machine.
We also tried the same Argon2 hash computation on a personal
laptop (Macbook Pro), and it took 8 ms. In total, hashing and ex-
ponentiation takes 47 ms for GPC, and 72 ms (an additional 25 ms)
for IDB. The cost of checking the bucket is also higher (compared
to HIBP and FSB) due to larger bucket sizes.
IDB takes only 31 ms more time on average than GPC (due
to one extra Argon2 hashing), while also leaking no additional
information about the user’s password. It is the most secure among
all the protocols we discussed (should username-password pairs be
available in the leak dataset), and runs in a reasonable time.
8 DEPLOYMENT DISCUSSION
Here we discuss different ways C3 services can be used and as-
sociated threats that need to be considered. A C3 service can be
queried while creating a password — during registration or pass-
word change — to ensure the new password is not present in a leak.
In this setting C3 is queried from a web server, and the client IP is
potentially not revealed to the server. This, we believe, is a safer
setting to use than the one we will discuss below.
In another scenario, a user can directly query a C3 service. A
user can look for leaked passwords themselves by visiting a web
site or using a browser plugin, such as 1Password [4] or Password
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Checkup [9]. This is the most prevalent use case of C3. For example,
the client can regularly check with a C3 service to proactively
safeguard user accounts from potential credential stuffing attacks.
However, there are several security concerns with this setting.
Primarily, the client’s IP is revealed to the C3 server in this setting,
making it easier for the attacker to deanonymize the user. Moreover,
multiple queries from the same user can lead to a more devastating
attack. Below we give two new threat models that need to consid-
ered for secure deployment of C3 services (where bucket identifiers
depend on the password).
Regular password checks. A user or webservice might want
to regularly check their passwords with C3 services. Therefore, a
compromised C3 server may learn multiple queries from the same
user, which can enable potentially powerful attacks. For FSB the
bucket identifier is chosen randomly, so knowing multiple bucket
identifiers for the same password will help an attacker narrow down
the password search space and significantly improve attack success.
We can mitigate this problem for FSB by derandomizing the
client side bucket selection using a client side state (e.g. browser
cookie) so the client always selects the same bucket for the same
password.We let the c be the client side cookie. To check a password
w with the C3 server, the client picks the jth bucket from the range
β(w), where j ← f (w ∥c) mod |β(w)|.
This derandomization ensures queries from the same device
are deterministic (after the cookie is set). However, if the attacker
can link queries of the same user from two different devices, the
mitigation is ineffective. If the cookie is stolen from the client device,
then the security of FSB is effectively reduced to that of HPB with
similar bucket sizes.
Similarly, if an attacker can track the interaction history between
a user and a C3 service, it can obtain better insight about the user’s
passwords. For example, if a user who regularly checks with a C3
service stops checking a particular bucket identifier, that could
mean the associated password may appear in the most up-to-date
leaked dataset, and the attacker can use that information to guess
the user’s password(s).
Checking similar passwords. Another important issue is query-
ing the C3 service with multiple correlated passwords. Some web
services, like 1Password, use HIBP to check multiple passwords for
a user. As shown by prior work, passwords chosen by the same user
are often correlated [24, 40, 46]. An attacker who can see bucket
identifiers of multiple correlated passwords can mount a stronger
attack. Such an attack would require estimating the joint distri-
bution over passwords. We leave analysis of this threat model for
future work.
9 RELATEDWORK
Private set intersection. The protocol task facing C3 services is
private set membership, a special case of private set intersection
(PSI) [29, 36]. The latter allows two parties to find the intersec-
tion between their private sets without revealing any additional
information.
Even state-of-the-art PSI protocols do not scale to the sizes
needed for our application. For example, Kiss et al. [30] proposed
an efficient PSI protocol for unequal set sizes based on oblivious
pseudo-random functions (OPRF). It performs well for sets with
millions of elements, but the bandwidth usage scales proportion-
ally to the size of the set and so performance is prohibitive in our
setting. Other efficient solutions to PSI [22, 31, 41, 42] have similar
prohibitive bandwidth usage.
Private information retrieval (PIR) [23] is another cryptographic
primitive used to retrieve information from a server. Assuming the
server’s dataset is public, the client can use PIR to privately retrieve
the entry corresponding to their password from the server. But
in our setting we also want to protect the privacy of the dataset
leak. Even if we relaxed that security requirement, the most ad-
vanced PIR schemes [17, 39] require exchanging large amounts of
information over the network, so they are not useful for checking
leaked passwords. PIR with two non-colluding servers can provide
better security [26] than the bucketization-based C3 schemes, with
communication complexity sub-polynomial in the size of the leaked
dataset. However, it requires building a C3 service with two servers
guaranteed to not collude, which may be practically difficult.
Compromised credential checking. To the best of our knowl-
edge, HIBP was the first publicly available C3 service. Junade Ali
designed the current HIBP protocol which uses bucketization via
prefix hashing to limit leakage. Google’s Password Checker extends
this idea to use PSI, which minimizes the information about the
leak revealed to clients. They also moved to checking username,
password pairs.
Google’s system was described in a paper by Thomas et al. [44],
which became available to us after we began work on this paper.
They introduced the design and implementation of their Google
Password Checker and report on measurments of its initial deploy-
ment. They recognized that their first generation protocol leaks
some bits of information about passwords, but did not analyze the
potential impact on password guessability. They also propose (what
we call) the ID-based protocol as a way to avoid this leakage. Our
paper provides further motivation for their planned transition to it.
Thomas et al. point out that password-only C3 services are likely
to have high false positive rates. Our new protocol FSB, being in the
password-only setting, inherits this limitation. That said, should
one want to do password-only C3 (e.g., because storing username,
password pairs is considered too high a liability given their utility
for credential stuffing), FSB represents the best known approach.
Other C3 services include, for example, Vericlouds [15] and
GhostProject [13]. They allow users to register with an email ad-
dress, and regularly keep the user aware of any leaked (sensitive)
information associated with that email. Such services send infor-
mation to the email address, and the user implicitly authenticates
(proves ownership of the email) by having access to the email ad-
dress. These services are not anonymous and must be used by the
primary user. Moreover, these services cannot be used for password-
only C3.
Distribution-sensitive cryptography. Our FSB protocol uses an
estimate of the distribution of human chosen passwords, making it
an example of distribution-sensitive cryptography, in which con-
structions use contextual information about distributions in order
to improve security. Previous distribution-sensitive approaches in-
clude Woodage et al. [48], who introduced a new type of secure
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sketch [25] for password typos, and Lacharite et al.’s [32] frequency-
smoothing encryption. While similar in that they use distributional
knowledge, their constructions do not apply in our setting.
10 CONCLUSION
We explore different settings and threat models associated with
checking compromised credentials (C3). The main concern is the
secrecy of the user passwords that is being checked. We show, via
simulations, that the existing industry deployed C3 services (such as
HIBP andGPC) do not provide adequate security. Indeed an attacker
who obtains the query to such a C3 service and the username of the
querying user can severly damage the secrecy of the password. We
give more secure C3 protocols for checking leaked passwords and
username-password pairs. We implemented and deployed different
C3 protocols on AWS Lambda and evaluated their computational
and bandwidth overhead. We finish with several nuanced threat
models and deployment discussions that should be considered when
deploying C3 services.
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Figure 11: Statistics on samples with low edit distance between user-
name and password, as a percentage of a random sample of 105 username-
password pairs.
A CORRELATION BETWEEN USERNAME
AND PASSWORDS
In Section 3 the username and password choices of previously un-
compromised users can be modeled independently.
To check whether this assumption would be valid or not, we ran-
domly sampled 105 username-password pairs from the dataset used
in Section 6 and calculated the Levenshtein edit distance between
each username and password in a pair. We have recorded the result
of this experiment in Figure 11.
We found that the mean edit distance between a username and
password was 9.4, while the mean password length was 8.4 char-
acters and the mean username length was 10.0 characters. This
supports that while there are some pairs where the password is
almost identical to the username, a large majority are not related
to the username at all.
B BANDWIDTH OF FSB
To calculate the maximum bandwidth used by FSB, we use the balls-
and-bins formula as described in Section 3. Each password w is
stored in |β(w)| buckets, so the total number of balls, or passwords
being stored, can be calculated as
m =
∑
w ∈?˜?
|β(w)|
=
∑
w ∈𝒲q¯∩?˜?
|ℬ | +
∑
w ∈?˜?\𝒲q¯
⌈ |ℬ | · pˆs (w)
pˆs (wq¯ )
⌉
≤ |𝒲q¯ ∩ 𝒮 | · |ℬ | +
∑
w ∈?˜?\𝒲q¯
( |ℬ | · pˆs (w)
pˆs (wq¯ ) + 1
)
≤ |ℬ | · q¯ + |ℬ | · 1
pˆs (wq¯ ) + N
The first equality is obtained by replacing the definition of β(w); the
second inequality holds because ⌈x⌉ ≤ x + 1; the third inequality
holds because S ⊆W .
The number of bins n = |ℬ |, andm > n logn, if q¯ > logn. There-
fore, the maximum bucket size for FSB would with high probability
be no more than 2 ·
(
q¯ + 1pˆs (wq¯ ) +
N
|ℬ |
)
.
C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2
Because the IDB bucketization scheme does not depend on the
password, Pr [B = b | W = w ∧U = u] = Pr [B = b | ∧U = u]
Advb-gsIDB (q)
=
∑
u
∑
b
max
w1, ...,wq
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi ∧U = u] · Pr [B = b | U = u]
=
∑
u
(∑
b
Pr [B = b | U = u]
)
max
w1, ...,wq
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi ∧U = u]
= Advgs(q)
The first step follows from independence of password and bucket
choice, and the third step is true because there is only one bucket
for each username.
D PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
First we calculate the general form of the BucketGuessβFSB advan-
tage. Then, we show that for q ≤ q¯, Advb-gsβFSB (q) = Adv
gs(q), and we
bound the difference in the advantages for the games when q > q¯.
Advb-gsβFSB (q) =
∑
u
∑
b
max
w1, ...,wq
∈α (b)
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi ∧U = u]
|βFSB(wi )|
=
∑
b
max
w1, ...,wq
∈α (b)
q∑
i=1
pˆs (wi )
|βFSB(wi )|
The second step follows from the independence of usernames and
passwords in the uncompromised setting.
We will use 𝒲q¯ to refer to the top q¯ passwords according to
password distribution pˆs = pw , and wq¯ to refer to the q¯th most
popular password according to pˆs .
For w ∈ 𝒲q¯ , we can calculate the fraction in the summation
exactly as pˆs (w )|βFSB(w ) | =
pˆs (w )
|ℬ | .
For any otherw ∈𝒲 \𝒲q¯ , we can bound the fraction using the
bound on the number of buckets a password is placed in.
|ℬ | · pˆs (w)
pˆs (wq¯ ) ≤ |βFSB(w)| <
|ℬ | · pˆs (w)
pˆs (wq¯ ) + 1.
We can use the lower bound on |βFSB(w)| to find that
pˆs (w)
|βFSB(w)| ≤
pˆs (wq¯ )
|ℬ | .
Using the upper bound on |βFSB(w)|,
pˆs (w)
|βFSB(w)| >
pˆs (w)
|ℬ | ·pˆs (w )
pˆs (wq¯ ) + 1
=
pˆs (w) · pˆs (wq¯ )
|ℬ | · pˆs (w) + pˆs (wq¯ ) =
pˆs (wq¯ )
|ℬ | + pˆs (wq¯ )pˆs (w )
Since the values of pˆs (w )|βFSB(w ) | are always larger for w ∈ 𝒲q¯ , the
values ofw1, . . . ,wq chosen for each bucket will be the top q¯ pass-
words overall, along with the top q − q¯ of the remaining passwords
in the bucket, ordered by pˆs (·)|βFSB(·) | .
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To find an upper bound on Advb-gsβFSB (q),∑
b
max
w1, ...,wq
∈α (b)
q∑
i=1
pˆs (wi )
|βFSB(wi )|
≤
∑
b
©­«
∑
w ∈𝒲q¯
pˆs (w)
|ℬ | + (q − q¯)
pˆs (wq¯ )
|ℬ |
ª®¬
= λq¯ + (q − q¯) · pq¯
For q ≤ q¯, we have Advb-gsβFSB (q) ≤ λq¯ .
To find a lower bound onAdvb-gsβFSB (q), letw
∗
q¯+1, . . . ,w
∗
q be theq−q¯
passwords in α(b) \𝒲q¯ with the highest probability of occurring,
according to pˆs (·).∑
b
max
w1, ...,wq
∈α (b)
q∑
i=1
pˆs (wi )
|βFSB(wi )|
>
∑
b
©­­«
∑
w ∈𝒲q¯
pˆs (w)
|ℬ | +
q∑
i=q¯+1
pˆs (wq¯ )
|ℬ | + pˆs (wq¯ )pˆs (w∗i )
ª®®¬
≥ λq¯ +
q∑
i=q¯+1
⌈ |ℬ | · pˆs (w∗i )
pˆs (wq¯ )
⌉
· pˆs (wq¯ )
|ℬ | + pˆs (wq¯ )pˆs (w∗i )
≥ λq¯ +
q∑
i=q¯+1
|ℬ | · pˆs (w∗i )
|ℬ | + pˆs (wq¯ )pˆs (w∗i )
≥ λq¯ +
q∑
i=q¯+1
pˆs (w∗i )
1 + pˆs (wq¯ )pˆs (w∗i )· |ℬ |
≥ λq¯ +
q∑
i=q¯+1
pˆs (w∗i )/2 ≥ λq¯ + (λq − λq¯ )/2 =
λq + λq¯
2
Therefore, ∆q ≥ λq−λq¯2 .
Note, for every password to be assigned to a bucket, |ℬ | ≥
pˆs (wq¯ )/pˆs (w), or for allw ∈𝒲 , pˆs (wq¯ )pˆs (w )· |ℬ | ≤ 1.
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